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Feingoldn  
Feinstein  
Harkin

YEAS (83)		NAYS (15)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Republican (53 or 96%)	Democrats (30 or 70%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (13 or 30%)	Republicans (0)	Democrats (2)
Abraham	Hutchinson				
Allard	Hutchison				
Ashcroft	Jeffords				
Bennett	Kempthorne				
Bond	Kyl				
Brownback	Lott				
Burns	Lugar				
Campbell	Mack				
Chafee	McCain				
Coats	McConnell				
Cochran	Murkowski				
Collins	Nickles				
Coverdell	Roberts				
Craig	Roth				
D'Amato	Santorum				
DeWine	Sessions				
Domenici	Shelby				
Enzi	Smith, Bob				
Faircloth	Smith, Gordon				
Frist	Snowe				
Gramm	Specter				
Grams	Stevens				
Grassley	Thomas				
Gregg	Thompson				
Hagel					
Hatch					
Helms					

**EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:**  
1—Official Business  
2—Necessarily Absent  
3—Illness  
4—Other  
  
**SYMBOLS:**  
AY—Announced Yea  
AN—Announced Nay  
PY—Paired Yea  
PN—Paired Nay

On principle, Congress clearly has the constitutional authority to make decisions on interstate taxation. We think that it would set a dangerous precedent for this particular Congress to pass a law that would limit the ability of future Congresses to exercise that constitutional authority. In practice, in the Senate, this amendment would not really have much effect. Our colleagues basically say that unless three-fifths, or 60, Senators favor an extension, then one should not be given. However, that is the same supermajority vote requirement that is needed to invoke cloture. It already takes 60 Senators to break a filibuster against any legislation; against a very determined filibuster, cloture may need to be invoked on a measure on numerous occasions to get it passed. Our point is that if fewer than 60 Senators favor an extension, it already is extremely unlikely that it will be possible to get an extension through the Senate. This amendment, in summary, is too late, has constitutional problems, and, at least as far as the Senate is concerned, would have little practical effect. We therefore urge its rej